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THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
No person shall "be deprived of life,' liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' This simple-sounding command and the notion
of protection of liberty interests have been the focus of much contro-
versy since congressional enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (Act). 2 The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission) charged with establishing sentencing guidelines3 for fed-
eral judges to rely on when sentencing convicted offenders. The intent
of the guidelines was to promote uniformity in sentencing in the face of
what had been described as "shameful disparity" in sentences which
were granted to similarly situated individuals;4 however, individual dis-
cretion which had traditionally resided with the sentencing judge was
eroded by the application of these guidelines.5 The guidelines went into
effect on November 1, 1987.6
OnJanuary 18, 1989, the Supreme Court decided Mistretta v. United
States7 which ruled that the sentencing guidelines were constitutional in
that they amounted to neither excessive delegation of legislative power
nor violation of the separation of powers principle. The Court did not
address, among other possible issues, the wisdom of fixed prison
sentences. The guidelines have been accused of being a mechanical sen-
tencing system which fails to be a satisfactory substitute for an exper-
ienced trial judge who can consider both compassion and skepticism
when passing sentence. 8 Since the Mistretta decision, the lower courts
have been plagued with challenges to the guidelines on different consti-
tutional grounds.
The Tenth Circuit has not been immune in the past year from chal-
lenges to these guidelines. Several cases argued before the court have
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (Supp. III 1985); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. III 1985).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).
4. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65, rerinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225]; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
5. See Recent Develonents, 42 ARK. L. REV. 1117 (1989).
6. The Act states:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range referred to in
subsection (a)(4), unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consider-
ation by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. IV
1986).
7. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
8. L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, § 5 (Opinion), at 4, col. 1.
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charged that the guidelines were improperly applied to the facts.9 The
cases of most interest after Mistretta are based on constitutional due pro-
cess challenges to the guidelines. The issue was raised several times
before the Tenth Circuit but was disposed of without a ruling.10 Fi-
nally, in United States v. Thomas,1I the court rejected a due process chal-
lenge to the guidelines.
Following a brief discussion of the history, of the guidelines, this
article examines the Tenth Circuit's holdings regarding the constitution-
ality of the federal sentencing guidelines and the future implications of
these holdings on subsequent constitutional challenges to this determi-
nate sentencing structure.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the changes that occurred through implementation of these
guidelines, sentencing in federal criminal cases was based on an indeter-
minate sentencing system. Under this past system, judges, while guided
by statutes specifying penalty ranges for individual crimes, had much
discretion to decide how severely or leniently to apply the statutory pen-
alty. 12 Parole was used as a supplement to this system, whereby an of-
fender was "returned to society under the 'guidance and control' of a
parole officer."1
The basis of sentencing under the old system was to foster and
potentiate the rehabilitation of the offender. The rationale underlying
this rehabilitative model was to minimize the risk to society that the of-
fender would resume criminal activity once he had completed his sen-
tence.1 4 In the 1970's, in the face of growing skepticism over the
rehabilitative purpose, discretionary sentencing structures became the
target of much criticism.' 5 Congress became aware that the rehabilita-
tion model had become "outmoded" and that the goal of rehabilitating
offenders was not being reached.' 6 The two negative consequences of
the indeterminate sentencing system noted in the Senate Report were
that there was disparity in sentences imposed on similarly situated indi-
viduals and that, consequently, uncertainty existed as to the time an of-
fender would spend in prison.' 7 As a result, in 1984, while public
concern was mounting about the increase in drug-related and violent
9. See United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465 (1oth Cir. 1990); United States v.
Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (1oth Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (1oth Cir.
1989); United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253 .(10th Cir. 1989).
10. See Lewis v. Martin, 880 F.2d 288 (1oth Cir. 1989); United States v. Goldbaum,
879 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1989).
11. 884 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1989).
12. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650 (1989).
13. Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id. See also A. VON HIRSCH, K. KNAPP & M. TONRY, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
AND ITS GUIDELINES 3.4 (1987)[hereinafter HIRSCH].
15. HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 3.




crimes, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
198418 which contained the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
The. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the United States
Sentencing Commission to draft guidelines to standardize sentences
imposed by federal courts upon similarly situated individuals for compa-
rable criminal conduct.1 9 The Commission was established "as an in-
dependent commission in the judicial branch of the United States."
'20
Congress mandated that the Commission be comprised of seven voting
members and one non-voting member. The members are appointed
through Senate approval of Presidential nominations. 2 1 One of the re-
quirements for composition of the Commission is that three members
must be federal judges and no more than four members are permitted to
be from the same political party.
22
The Commission was charged with promulgating determinative
sentence guidelines and periodically reviewing and revising the guide-
lines. 23 Furthermore, it was required that the Commission must, at least
annually, submit to Congress an analysis of the operation of the
guidelines.
24
Practically, the guidelines are based on a grid system. A sentencing
range is given based on the "offense level," which is calculated by ad-
justing the "base level" of a particular criminal offense through applica-
tion of some offense and offender characteristics. 25 The base level is the
assigned value associated with a particular offense before any adjust-
ments are made. The mitigating and aggravating'factors to be consid-
ered in adjusting the base level have been surrounded by controversy.
The guidelines have been accused of failing to adequately consider im-
portant offender characteristics "such as age, prior drug history, and ex-
tent of the individual offender's blameworthiness for the specific crime
for which he is being sentenced."
'26
The Commission had been encouraged by Congress to explore the
"relevancy to the purposes of sentencing of all kinds of factors, whether
they are obviously pertinent or not; to subject those factors to'intelligent
and dispassionate professional analysis; and on this basis to recommend,
18. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 2. This act was a bipartisan congressional effort to change and
recodify the federal criminal code. Changes made by this law included: (1) changes in the
areas of sentencing, bail reform, drug trafficking, computer fraud, and criminal forfeiture;
(2). establishment of a fund for compensation of victims of violent crimes; (3) revision of
the insanity defense; (4) substantive changes to some of the federal statutes that dealt with
the commission of violent or nonviolent serious offenses; and (5) some amendments to
criminal code procedures to facilitate smoother operation of the federal criminal justice
system. See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
20. Id. § 991(a).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 994(o).
24. Id. § 994(w).
25. Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1949 (1988).
26. Id. at 1951.
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with supporting reasons, the fairest and most effective guidelines it can
devise."' 27 Yet, the Commission determined only three general catego-
ries of factors to be relevant: (1) the defendant's criminal history; (2) the
defendant's dependence upon criminal activity for livelihood; and (3)
the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the wrongdoing. 28
While the rigidity of the sentencing guidelines has resulted in re-
cent challenges in the Tenth Circuit, a preliminary challenge - whether
the Commission itself was constitutional - was decided in 1989 by the
United States Supreme Court.
B. Mistretta v. United States
1. Facts
Mistretta, under indictment for three counts arising from a cocaine
sale, challenged the constitutionality of the Commission's guidelines on
the grounds that the Commission was formed in violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, and that Congress had delegated excessive au-
thority to the Commission to structure the guidelines.29 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the face of varying holdings
on this same issue by different circuit courts. In fact, certiorari was
granted while an appeal was still pending on the case in the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 30 On both issues the Court rejected the constitu-
tional challenges, holding that Congress did not delegate excessive
legislative power to the Commission and did not violate the separation
of powers doctrine by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch.
27. See S. REP. No. 225,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 175, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3220, 3358.
28. Ogletree, supra note 25, at 1953. Other factors which Congress recommended be
considered relevant to the sentencing procedure include age, education, mental and emo-
tional condition, criminal history, dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood, and
community ties.
All of these factors are not considered. Specifically, Chapters Three and Four of
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Guidelines Manual (1989), in several parts, list the
adjustments to be considered in altering the offense level.
There are victim-related adjustments (§ 3A). These include victim characteristics
such as whether the victim was vulnerable or was an official. Also included is a considera-
tion of whether the victim was restrained.
There are adjustments to be made depending on the offender's role in the offense.
To be considered under this Part (§ 3B) is whether the offender played an aggravating
role, a mitigating role or if he abused a position of trust or special skill.
Under Part C (§ 3C) is a consideration of whether the offender willfully obstructed or
impeded proceedings during the investigation or prosecution of the offense.
Part D of Chapter Three guides the sentencing judge in adjustments to be made when
there are multiple counts of conviction against the offender.
The final Part of Chapter Three (§ 3E) authorizes the sentencing judge to adjust the
offense level based on the offender's acceptance of responsibility for his/her criminal con-
duct.
Chapter Four allows for adjustments to the base level sentence based on the of-
fender's criminal history and reliance on criminal activities for livelihood.
29. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 653.




a. Excessive Delegation of Legislative Power
The Court found excessive authority was not delegated because
Congress had provided the Commission with an "intelligible principle"
to use in establishing the guidelines. 3 1 This intelligible principle is a
specific delineation of the bounds of discretion, by the delegating party
(Congress), within which the body exercising delegated power must
act.3 2 The boundaries placed upon the Commission by Congress (relied
upon by the Court) included congressional specifications of the goals of
the Commission, 33 the "'purposes' of sentencing that the Cpmmission
must pursue in carrying out its mandate"3 4 and the specific tool, for the
Commission to use in promoting its prescribed'goals - the guidelines
system. 35 In finding that the criteria which Congress supplied the Com-
mission were adequate to reject a challenge based on excessive delega-
tion of legislative authority, the Court discussed the fact that Congress
also provided the Commission with criteria on how the Commission
should promulgate the guidelines.
3 6
b. Separation of Powers
Despite the importance of the principle that each of the three
branches of government must remain free of the control of the other
branches, the Court recognized that there is no requirement that the
branches must be completely distinct and separate.3 7 Further, the
Court reasoned, except in the cases of "most compelling constitutional
reasons," a congressional act that has become law and that addresses a
"deeply vexing national problem" will not be invalidated.
3 8
A further argument was advanced that, because the Act requires
there be a Presidential appointment of federal judges to serve on the
Commission, the Act undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch.
3 9
The Court recognized, however, that Congress has the authority to au-
thorize a federal judge, in an individual capacity, to perform an execu-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 654-58.
33. The Court quoted 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1), supra note 2: "[To 'assure the meeting
of the purposes of sentencing as set forth' in the Act; to 'provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit indi-
vidualized sentences,' where appropriate; and to 'reflect to the extent practicable, advance-
ment in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.'" Id. at
655-56.
34. "'[To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense'; 'to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct'; 'to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant'; and 'to provide the
defendant with needed ... correctional treatment.'" Id. at 655-56 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2), supra note 2).
35. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 656.
36. Id. at 656-58.
37. Id. at 659.
38. Id. at 661.
39. Id. at 667.
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tive function without violating the separation of powers doctrine.40 The
judges' roles on the Commission, reasoned the Court, are that of com-
missioners or administrators, separate and distinct from their judicial
roles.
4 1
A due process challenge was not raised in Mistretta. After Mistretta
was decided, a challenge to the guidelines, based on a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine and an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative authority, was brought before the Tenth Circuit.4 2 These argu-
ments were, naturally, quickly rejected based on the Mistretta precedent.
III. TENTH CIRCurr OPINIONS
A. United States v. Thomas
1. Facts
Thomas was found guilty by jury verdict of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana. After the verdict, but prior to sentencing, he filed
a motion to have the sentencing guidelines declared unconstitutional.
The trial judge implicitly denied this motion by sentencing Thomas
under the guidelines; however, the judge did assign an alternative sen-
tence in case the guidelines were found to be unconstitutional on
appeal.
4 s
Thomas charged that the guidelines violated his due process right
to have a judge make a discretionary individualized determination of an
appropriate sentence, that the guidelines deprived him of "meaningful
participation" in the sentencing process by limiting his ability to present
evidence relevant to sentencing, and, finally, that the guidelines unlaw-
fully allowed the prosecutor and the Commission, rather than the sen-
tencing judge, to determine his sentence. 44 The court rejected all of
Thomas' due process arguments, joining the other circuit courts4 5 in
refusing to find a due process violation. 46 Since Thomas, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has not readdressed the due process issue in the context of the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines.
4 7
2. Substantive Due Process
a. Holding
The first holding of Thomas was that there exists no federal substan-
40. Id. at 671.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811, 812 (10th Cir. 1989).
43. United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 541 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id.
45. See United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Pinto,
875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15 (Ist Cir. 1989); United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. White,
869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989); United
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989).
46. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 542.
47. See United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1990).
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tive liberty interest in an individualized determination of an appropriate
sentence. The court found that the recognition of an inherent human
right to individualized treatment in sentencing would be
inconsistent with the generally accepted notion that both retri-
buition, which focuses on the interests of the victim rather than
the status of the defendant, and general deterrence, which fo-
cuses on the interests of society at large rather than the status
of the defendant, are appropriate societal versions for imposing
sanctions.
48
In finding the nonexistence. of a constitutional right to judicial dis-
cretion in individualized sentencing, the Tenth Circuit cited the Second
Circuit. The Second Circuit had articulated that, if such a right existed,
it would surely be recognized by now, given the varying mandatory mini-
mum sentencing practices the federal government and the states have
used in our nation's history.49 In further support of the nonexistence of
a constitutional substantive due process right to individual determina-
tion in sentencing, the court relied on the reasoning in Mistretta. It rea-
soned that, since Mistretta upheld Congress' power to divest the courts
of their sentencing discretion and establish exact, mandatory sentences
for all federal offenses, that Congress may also constitutionally circum-
scribe the discretion of the court in sentencing through the imposition
of these guidelines. 50
Even though the court found that no right to individualized treat-
ment in sentencing exists, the court stated that the guidelines do allow
for some discretion by the sentencing court:
Under the Guidelines, sentencing judges retain discretion to
accept or reject a plea bargain, to resolve factual disputes about
the appropriate base offense level, to consider adjusting that
base level for mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to
choose from a range of sentences, to set probation conditions,
and to determine when to depart from the Guidelines. 51
b. Analysis
At its inception, the Act identified the basic purposes of sentencing
as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 52 Yet,
Congress, in its hearings, acknowledged that rehabilitation alone, the
previously unsuccessful underlying sentencing theory, was not "an ap-
propriate basis for sentencing decisions."1
53
Sentencing could arguably fulfill its purposes of retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation without denying a defendant
the right to individualized sentence determination. The victim's and so-
ciety's interests could be brought more to bear upon the sentence if the
48. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 542-43 (citation omitted).
49. United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 543. -
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827- 828 (8th Cir. 1989)).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
53. S. REP. No, 225, supra note 4, at 40 n.16.
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judge were allowed greater latitude in determining an appropriate sen-
tence through consideration of the defendant's character, the victim's
losses, and the risk posed to society by that particular individual.
The court's reliance on the argument that if a right to individual
sentencing existed, it would have been articulated by now in the face of a
history of variety in mandatory minimum sentencing schemes is not sur-
prising given the reluctance of thejudiciary to expand the realm of fun-
damental rights. Sentencing schemes with only mandatory minimum
sentencing requirements vary, and, assuredly, some provide for much
more discretion than others. Discretionary sentencing practices were
prominent until the 1970's when rehabilitation was considered to be a
primary goal.54 American statutes typically set only maximum penalties
for each crime, and the judge had the choice of any sentence within the
limit: a fine, probation, jail sentence or a shorter or longer term in state
prison.55 Judicial discretion under these sentencing patterns did vary,
but was greater than the discretion now sanctioned under the federal
guidelines. Thejudge could usually impose any maximum or minimum
sentence within the statutorily defined limits. 56 It is possible that the
only reason that a right to individualized sentencing was not brought to
light previously is because, under indeterminate sentencing structures,
sentences were much more, albeit not totally nor consistently, individu-
alized. It is interesting to note that, although the court failed to find a
federal substantive liberty interest in an individualized determination of
an appropriate sentence, the court did discuss the fact that the guide-
lines allow for some judicial discretion. 57 Thus, a close reading of this
case uncovers an underlying tension. If no entitlement to individualized
sentencing exits, the court need not defend the guidelines on the
ground that they allow for some individualization.
3. Procedural Due Process
Thomas' procedural due process arguments charged that the guide-
lines deprived him of meaningful participation in the sentencing process
because they limited the factors relevant to sentencing. He claimed his
liberty interest was violated as a result of this procedure. The court had
little trouble rejecting this argument, finding it to be substantially the
same as the individualized sentencing substantive due process
argument. 58
B. United States v. Roberts
1. Facts
Recently, the Tenth Circuit rejected another constitutional attack
54. J. MILLER, M. ROBERTS & C. CARTER, SENTENCING REFORM: A REVIEW AND ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 (1981).
55. HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 3.
56. Id. at 3-6.
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
58. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 544.
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on the guidelines. A vagueness challenge to the term "more serious
offense" was raised in United States v. Roberts5 9 by the defendant, Rob-
erts, who was sentenced under a provision using this term. Roberts pled
guilty to a charge alleging one count of assault with intent to commit a
felony within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
60
Under the challenged provision, a defendant convicted pursuant to
a guilty plea "containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more
serious offense than the offense of the conviction," must be sentenced
under the standards for the more serious offense. 6 1 A stipulation ex-
isted in Roberts' plea agreement concerning the circumstances of the
offense. It established that the defendant's acts constituted the more
serious crime of robbery even though his plea bargain resulted in a con-
viction for a less serious offense of assault with intent to commit a fel-
ony. 62
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit rejected Roberts' vagueness argument, holding
that the guidelines adequately define what constitutes a more serious
offense. 63 Due process, therefore, is not offended by utilization of this
term because the guidelines' assignment of numeric values to a base of-
fense and possible adjustments set explicit standards, preventing arbi-
trary or discriminatory interpretation of a "more serious offense."
64
3. Analysis
The vagueness argument raised by Roberts was a futile attempt in
light of the sophisticated grid system of sentence determination enacted
precisely to eliminate ambiguities and govern with certainty the sentenc-
ing determination.
Not addressed by the court in Roberts and relevant to the application
of the sentencing guidelines in the presence of a plea bargain, was the
issue of who actually decides the sentence. It has been argued that the
sentencing discretion in this instance shifts from the judge to the prose-
cutor.65 This issue has been a major source of contention since the im-
plementation of the guidelines. 66 The basis of the argument is that not
every defendant, although a majority, has access to plea bargaining.
59. 898 F.2d 1465, 1467 (10th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1466.
61. UNrED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.2(a) (1989).
62. Roberts, 898 F.2d at 1469.
63. Id. at 1467-68.
64. Id. at 1467.
65. Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult Choices for the New Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission, 35 CATm. U.L. REv. 181 (1985).
66. A detailed analysis of this problem, in light of the many in-depth articles and
books on the topic, is outside the scope of this article. For further information, see Hirsch,
supra note 14, at 142-76;J. MILLER, M. ROBERTS, C. CARTER, SENTENCING REFORM: A RE-
VIEW AND ANNOTATED B1BLIOGRAPHY 1 (1981). Both contain excellent bibliographies of
additional sources on this topic.
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The decision for this is left in the prosecutor's hands, not the judge's.
This theory is based on the presumption that a prosecutor, through
charging and negotiating a plea will determine the disposition of the
sentence, thereby undermining the sentencing guidelines.67 Is it right
that the sentencing reforms should, in an effort to decrease.sentencing
disparity, remove judicial discretion and place it instead in the hands of
members of the executive branch? Congress was concerned with this
problem and directed the Commission to issue policy statements to
guide judges in deciding the acceptability of plea bargaining agree-
ments.68 This is an issue not yet before the courts, but'one which the
Commission, under a directive from Congress, should be evaluating.
69
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The holding of Mistretta answers separation of powers concerns;
however, it does not solve other constitutional problems surrounding
the use of sentencing guidelines.
The argument that no fundamental right to individualized sentenc-
ing exists because it has not existed historically in the presence of mini-
mum sentencing requirements seems to beg the question. In light of
changed circumstances, the courts should more fully evaluate whether
constitutional protection of liberty interests should be expanded to in-
clude a constitutional right to individual sentencing.
70
Procedural due process guarantees defendants the right to a fair
hearing. Whether it also guarantees an individual a right to a fair hear-
ing on sentencing, after a fair hearing on conviction, is a question to
consider. Instructing judges how to weigh the circumstances of their
cases turns a sentencing hearing into a mere formality, where individual
attributes (except those provided for in the guidelines) can neither hin-
der nor aid an individual's case.
The holding in Thomas, and other circuit court holdings which ap-
prove the guidelines, will not promote reform. Rather, the issue will be
further obscured as later courts use these holdings as precedent.
It has been suggested that the sentencing guidelines should be
amended so that an individual's motivation for committing an offense is
considered in the sentencing decision. 7 1 This suggestion could be taken
a step further so that all of the factors originally suggested to the Com-
mission by Congress would be given consideration in the formation of
the sentencing guidelines.7 2 This model has been termed the guided
67. See Comment, supra note 65, at 200.
68. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 63.
69. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
70. For example, the right of privacy, a liberty interiest, was expanded in 1973 to in-
clude the right of a woman to choose abortion in the face of changed public sentiment and
changed technology. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. See Legal Times, Aug. 28, 1989, at 21, col. 1 (comment by Judy Clarke, Federal
Defender).
72. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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discretion model.73 Until the time that new reforms are implemented,
the duty of-the judiciary is to focus the Commission on the practical
effects of these guidelines. Trial judges should write sentencing opin-
ions in cases where the guidelines present problems. Ideally, these
opinions would include the process used to determine the sentence, the
exercise of discretion within the guidelines and the basis of that exer-
cise, and the reasons for any departure from the guidelines. 74 Then, in
the face of these opinions and through a reevaluation process, the Sen-
tencing Commission would have a framework-upon which to institute
needed reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Fairness in sentencing is the concern of the judiciary. When Con-
gress empowered the United States Sentencing Commission to establish
federal sentencing guidelines, it also had fairness in mind. Unfortu-
nately, the guidelines have overcbred the problem. Now, two defend-
ants whose conduct is the same but whose character and potential for
rehabilitation appear to be greatly different are subject to identical
sentences. By declaring the guidelines constitutional, the Tenth Circuit,
along with other circuits, has foregone the opportunity to modify the
guidelines. This, however, need not end the discussion. Findings of
constitutionality do not mean that the goal of consistent, yet fair, sen-
tencing has been achieved. The creation of the Commission, and there-
fore the guidelines, was a legislative action. Through the political
process, if not the judicial process, necessary reform can and should be
achieved.
Maureen Juran
73. As a guide for instigation of this revised model, Ogletree, supra note 25, at 1956-
57, suggested that the Commission examine the Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence. In the death penalty area more than any other, the Court struggled with proce-
dural and due process issues in criminal sentencing. Even though the nature of the
sanction differs, the Court's efforts to achieve equity in that area are relevant to the goal of
achieving equity in other sentencing areas.
74. Legal Times, supra note 72, col. 3 (comment ofJudge Robert Sweet, U.S. Dist. Ct.
for Southern Dist. of N.Y.).
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